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Abstract 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promises free elementary 
education and free choice of schools to children and their parents. Inter-
national fora emphasise the first right while neglecting the second. This essay 
examines arguments for limiting school choice and finds each of them to be 
unconvincing. It then describes three school systems: India, with free choice, 
but only for those who can afford to pay; Sweden, with taxpayer-funded free 
choice for everyone; and Finland, which allows parents almost no choice at all 
in basic education. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at 
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary 
education shall be compulsory. Article 26(i) 
 
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children. Article 26(iiii) 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
 
The United Nations General Assembly in 1948 recognized basic education as a 
human right and called for primary education everywhere to be compulsory 
and free. Declaring something to be a right is not the same as achieving it, and 
progress was slow. Four decades later more than 100 million children lacked 
access to primary schooling, and millions more attended schools that failed to 
equip them with even minimal levels of literacy and numeracy. In 1990 
delegates to the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand 
pledged to meet the goal of universal basic education by the year 2000. The 
number of children in school increased in the subsequent decade, but so did 
the number out of school, and the goal was not met. At the World Education 
Forum 2000 in Dakar, Senegal, delegates moved the target date to the year 
2015. The General Assembly, in its Millennium Declaration of 8 September 
2000, adopted this target and the date as one of its goals. 
 
 The General Assembly in 1948 also recognized as a human right the 
freedom of parents “to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
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children”. This right is violated, to a greater or lesser extent, in nearly every 
country on Earth, and progress has been slower toward the right to school 
choice than it has been toward the right to basic education. Nonetheless, 
delegates to Jomtien in 1990 , and Dakar in 2000 ignored freedom of choice, 
as did the General Assembly in its Millennium Declaration of September 
2000. This is a pity because school choice is important, not only in its own 
right but also because it can promote universal education by making schools 
more attractive to parents and children. 
 
This essay is about school choice, not privatisation. Meaningful choice 
is not possible without access to private schools. But privatisation alone does 
nothing to increase choice; it simply transforms a government monopoly into 
a private monopoly. The question addressed, then, is not why government 
finances schools, but rather why government finances only a subset of schools, 
typically those it owns and operates. For most goods and services, expanded 
consumer choice translates into greater welfare. What is different about 
schooling? An examination of the school systems of India, Sweden and 
Finland sheds light on this issue. 
 
 
Arguments against school choice 
 
Our first example is India, in part because it is a large country, home to 22% of 
the world’s population and 46% of its illiterates, but more importantly because 
it has a typical school system with limited choice that has been the object of a 
number of excellent studies, including Public Report on Basic Education in 
India (PROBE Team, 1999).  
 
India, like most countries in the world today, limits free schooling 
largely to government schools, but permits choice for those who are willing 
and able to pay full tuition fees at a private school. How good are government 
schools in India compared to those that are privately run? The PROBE Team 
(1999, pp. 63-64) sought to answer this question by visiting, unannounced, all 
schools in 188 randomly selected villages in four, educationally backward 
northern states. These villages, with populations in the range of 300 to 
300,000, contained 195 government schools and 41 private schools.1 In half of 
the government schools they found no teaching activity at all at the time of the 
visit. Moreover, this pattern of idleness “is not confined to a minority of 
irresponsible teachers—it has become a way of life in the profession”. In 
contrast, they found a “high level of teaching activity in private schools, even 
makeshift ones where the work environment is no better than in government 
schools.” The report stresses 
 
                                                 
1
 The PROBE Team (p. 103) acknowledges that they missed some private schools, especially the 
unrecognized schools that are not allowed to issue certificates. Results for a survey of Himachal 
Pradesh are reported separately in chapter 9 of the PROBE study. In that state, the team surveyed 48 
randomly selected villages, which contained 48 government schools and—by their count—9 private 
schools.  Because government schools were functioning relatively well in rural areas of Himachal 
Pradesh, very few private schools operated there, even though incomes are higher in Himachal Pradesh 
than in the other four surveyed states. 
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“the key role of accountability in the schooling system. In a 
private school, the teachers are accountable to the manager (who 
can fire them), and, through him or her, to the parents (who can 
withdraw their children). In a government school, the chain of 
accountability is much weaker, as teachers have a permanent job 
with salaries and promotions unrelated to performance. This 
contrast is perceived with crystal clarity by the vast majority of 
parents.” 
 
The poor, of course, cannot afford high tuition fees. In Indian villages, 
however, fees at private schools are low, much lower than the cost to taxpayers 
of government schools, in large part because “private-school teachers … 
receive very low salaries—often less than one-fifth of the salary of a 
government teacher with similar teaching responsibilities” (PROBE Team, 
1999, p. 104). Because of these low tuition fees, “even among poor families 
and disadvantaged communities, one finds parents who make great sacrifices 
to send some or all of their children to private schools, so disillusioned are 
they with government schools” (PROBE Team, 1999, p. 103). Nonetheless, the 
very poor, realistically, face a choice of attending the government school or 
dropping out, and many opt for the latter. If tuition fees were reduced or 
eliminated at private schools, more parents would no doubt keep their 
children in school rather than allow them to drop out.  
 
The authors of Public Report on Basic Education in India are sincere in 
their desire to make schools and teachers accountable to parents, yet they 
insist that this be accomplished through collective action, without providing 
public finance to private schools. This is not an easy task because “neglect of 
elementary education has been a persistent feature of public policy in most 
states since independence” (PROBE Team, 1999, p.131). It is, of course, 
possible for parents to make government schools accountable to their needs, 
as success in the states of Kerala (Drèze and Sen, 1995; Sen, 1997) and 
Himachal Pradesh (PROBE Team, 1999, pp. 115-127) demonstrates. In 
Himachal Pradesh, one of the success stories, it is  
 
“the vigilance of parents, and their ability to keep the local 
teachers and administrators on their toes, that keeps the system 
going. The role of parental vigilance as an accountability 
mechanism takes a conspicuous form from time to time, for 
instance when a school threatens to break down. We heard 
several interesting stories of villagers resorting to spontaneous 
agitation (e.g., blocking the road or threatening to boycott the 
elections) to obtain a new school, or effect the transfer of 
negligent teachers " (PROBE Team, 1999, p. 124). 
 
Clearly, though possible, it is difficult for parents to assert their rights through 
collective action. It is much easier to change schools than to change the school. 
 
A simple and direct way to empower parents is for government to stand 
prepared to pay the tuition fees of any student at a competing, private school 
up to the amount it spends per student in a government school. The PROBE 
team (1999, pp. 105-106) rejects this option on grounds that private education 
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has “serious limitations” compared to public education. Their arguments are 
not compelling, however, nor are they new. The alleged limitations of private 
education are: 
 
1. Private teachers prepare students only to pass examinations, 
so they “have little reason to promote the personal development 
of the children …or to impart a sense of values.” Values are not 
defined, but the authors of this report presumably have in mind 
common values of civil society, which are necessary if modern 
democracy is to function smoothly. 
 
2. Since “private schools often take advantage of the 
vulnerability of parents,” government must protect children 
from poor choices that might otherwise be made by their 
parents. 
 
3. “Private schooling remains out of reach of the vast majority of 
poor parents, who cannot afford the fees and other expenses.” As 
a result, “children enrolled in private schools come mainly from 
better-off families.” This, presumably, is objectionable only on 
egalitarian grounds. The PROBE team makes this argument 
explicit in what they list as a fourth danger of private education: 
it “may lead to a very divisive pattern of schooling opportunities, 
with better-off parents sending their children to private schools 
while poorer parents are left to cope with non-functional 
government schools.” 
 
We examine each of these arguments in turn. 
 
 
Impart civil values (civic education) 
 
The need to transmit common values to children is the oldest argument for 
state control of education. It is for this reason that Aristotle, like his teacher, 
Plato, disliked the schools of his day, which were private and independent of 
government. In 350 BCE, Aristotle drafted this forward-looking piece of 
advice: 
 
“[I]t is manifest that education should be one and the same for 
all, and that it should be public, and not private—not as at 
present, when every one looks after his own children separately, 
and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks 
best; the training in things which are of common interest should 
be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the 
citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state….” 
(Politics, Book Eight, Part I) 
 
The pronoun ‘himself’ is deliberate; women were not citizens in ancient 
Athens, so were thought to have no need of education. This applied as well to 
slaves and other non-citizens. 
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Today, much has changed: state schools dominate, and they educate 
girls as well as boys. But some things remain the same: champions of 
government schools continue to invoke the ‘civic education’ argument in their 
defence (see Kremer and Sarychev, 2000; Macedo, 2000; Gradstein and 
Justman, 2002; Pritchett, 2003). 
 
There are three problems with this view. First, the ‘civic education’ 
argument should call not only for government schools, but also for 
compulsory attendance at government schools to ensure that all students are 
taught the same common values. In practice, attendance at government 
schools is rarely compulsory. Most governments, including that of India, allow 
parents to pay private tuition at a school of their choice, and some allow home 
schooling as well. Second, it is inconsistent with decentralised systems of 
education in nation-states such as India, Canada and the United States, where 
the school curriculum is far from uniform across states, provinces or 
municipalities. Third, and most importantly, it assumes that governments can 
control the curriculum if they own the schools. Large bureaucracies have a life 
of their own; state school teachers, in particular, are prone to form powerful 
unions and are not easy to control. Paradoxically, it may be easier for 
government to control private schools, by threatening to revoke licences if 
specified standards are not met (see Gintis, 1995; Shleifer, 1998). 
 
Apart from the question of how best to transmit uniform values to 
pupils, there remains the much broader issue of whether such a goal is 
desirable. Writers in the classical liberal tradition celebrate diversity, and 
argue that uniformity of thought, in religion, politics or any area of study, 
ought to be avoided at all costs. John Stuart Mill, in a famous passage from his 
essay On Liberty (1909 [1859], chapter V), expressed this view most 
eloquently: 
 
“A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding 
people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which 
it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the 
government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an 
aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in 
proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a 
despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one 
over the body. An education established and controlled by the 
State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many 
competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example 
and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of 
excellence.” 
 
Sixteen years later, Karl Marx (1875) took an even stronger stand against 
government schools: 
 
“Elementary education by the state' is altogether objectionable. 
Defining by a general law the expenditures on the elementary 
schools, the qualifications of the teaching staff, the branches of 
instruction, etc., and ... supervising the fulfillment of these legal 
specifications by state inspectors, is a very different thing from 
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appointing the state as the educator of the people! Government 
and church should rather be equally excluded from any influence 
on the school.” 
 
On the subject of school choice, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
a very liberal document. The Declaration states that parents have a right to 
choose the education of their children and does not qualify this right in any 
way. Parental choice is not restricted to schools operated by the state, and 
parents are not asked to give up their right to free education in order to 
exercise their right to choice of education. Preferences of individuals are 
respected even when they conflict with collective values of the nation-state. 
 
 
Protect children 
 
A second argument against school choice asserts that many or most parents 
are not capable of choosing wisely the education that is best for their own 
children, so government ought to make this choice for them. This is different 
from the ‘civic education’ argument because, under this criterion, government 
intervenes in the interest of individuals, not in the interest of society as a 
whole. In effect, the state behaves as a loving parent to all children, so this can 
be described as a paternalistic argument for government schools. 
 
The argument dates from the 16th century Protestant Reformation, 
which set as its goal universal, compulsory education for everyone, girls as 
well as boys. Protestants were concerned that the adult population of their day 
was overwhelmingly illiterate and, presumably, too ignorant to make correct 
choices for the Christian education of their children. Martin Luther (1962, p. 
355), as leader of the Reformation, expressed this sentiment with great clarity 
in a letter directed to councilmen of all the cities of Germany in the year 1524: 
 
“[T]he great majority of parents unfortunately are wholly 
unfitted for this task [of educating the young]. They do not know 
how children should be brought up and taught, for they 
themselves have learned nothing but how to care for their 
bellies. It takes extraordinary people to bring children up right 
and teach them well.” 
 
According to Luther (1962 [1524], p. 370), government officials should be 
entrusted to select these “extraordinary people” to staff schools where children 
can study “for one or two hours during the day, and spend the remainder of 
the time working at home, learning a trade, or doing whatever is expected of 
them”. 
 
Nearly five centuries after Luther wrote these words, precisely the same 
assertion of parental ignorance continues to be invoked to justify government 
control of schools, not only in India, but also in developed countries that have 
attained near universal adult literacy. (For a clear statement of this view, see 
the remarks of Professor John F. Covaleskie in Glass, 1994; see also Dwyer, 
1998 and Barry, 2001.) 
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No doubt some parents are unable, or unwilling, to make an informed 
choice of school for their children. Does this justify denying all parents their 
right to school choice? In other aspects of child welfare, such as food, shelter 
and clothing, parents are given the benefit of the doubt. The state assumes 
custody only of those children whose parents are unable or unwilling to 
provide for them. The state does not assume the task of selecting food, shelter 
and clothing for all children. 
 
In any case, it is possible to address paternalistic concerns of society 
with measures short of denying school choice to all parents. Government can 
insist on minimum standards before licensing a school, eliminating the 
possibility that a parent makes a truly bad selection. It can punish schools that 
mislead or misinform parents of prospective students, publicise the results for 
each school of standard examinations of its students, and prohibit spending of 
public money for purposes unrelated to education. It can specify a core 
curriculum for all schools. Regulation has its cost, however, which takes the 
form of restricted choice. The heavy hand of regulation can eliminate choice 
just as effectively as refusal to finance private schooling.  
 
 
Promote equality 
 
The idea of promoting equality of opportunity through education is based on 
the following argument. Markets are inevitably inequitable because they 
distribute goods and services in a very unequal fashion. To ensure equality of 
access to secondary and higher education, all children should receive the same 
basic education. This can be guaranteed only with government schools. If 
people are given the freedom to choose among competing schools, they will 
sort themselves by social class, ethnic group or level of ability, thereby 
harming those who end up in schools filled with students of low social origin 
and limited intellectual talent. In the words of one opponent of school choice, 
“once we have isolated most low income children ‘in their own schools’ it will 
be difficult to sustain the significantly higher-than-average expenditures such 
children need to receive a quality education. This, in turn, means that all 
children in government schools that serve low-income students will have a 
lower quality education than they now have” (Hawley, 1995). 
 
Albert Hirschman, in his influential book Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 
added a twist to this argument. In competitive markets, customers are free to 
‘exit’ a service by switching to another supplier. The alternative to ‘exit’ is 
‘voice’, expression of dissatisfaction directly to management or through 
general protest. These two reactions of exit and voice, Hirschman (1970, p. 47) 
reasoned, do not work well together because “those customers who care most 
about the quality of the product and who, therefore, are those who would be 
the most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason 
also those who are apparently likely to exit first in the case of deterioration.” 
In the case of public schools, it is best to deny articulate complainers the right 
of exit: a ‘tight monopoly’ is preferable to a system that allows schools to 
compete for students. In sum, government schools will improve if attendance 
is made compulsory; they will deteriorate if government facilitates the ‘exit’ of 
unhappy parents. 
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The ‘equality of opportunity’ argument is well intentioned but 
misguided, for it is based on a false premise. Government schools are not 
synonymous with equality of opportunity. Families sort themselves 
geographically by social class and by ethnic group when they choose their 
place of residence. Parents prefer to send children, especially young children, 
to a school near their place of residence, so some schools end up with 
disproportionate numbers of deprived children whereas others receive 
disproportionate numbers of privileged children. 
 
Governments can reverse the effects of geographic sorting by trans-
porting children to distant schools, thus obtaining, across schools, greater 
uniformity in the social class and ethnic origin of students. This is disliked by 
parents, especially parents of small children. An alternative way to promote 
equality is to ensure that all schools, regardless of the ethnic or social 
composition of the student body, offer the same standard of education. This 
requires directing a larger share of resources to schools that enrol large 
numbers of deprived children. This is also difficult, for such measures can be 
resisted by competent teachers, who resist transfers to difficult schools, or 
thwarted by parents who contract private, supplemental tutoring. Another 
tactic used by articulate and educated parents is to stay in the state system, 
but capture the schools for their own interests, which may conflict with 
interests of the poor and the ethnic minorities. One way this happens is with 
the introduction of ‘streaming’, the separation of students by ability, which 
results in their separation by social strata as well. More resources can then be 
channelled to the ‘high performing’ stream of students, at the expense of other 
students in the school. 
 
Government schools, then, often fail to provide children with equality 
of opportunity. Markets, on the other hand, can be beneficial for the poor 
because markets are inequitable only if there is an inequitable distribution of 
purchasing power. So long as there is government finance of education, the 
market for education can be made as equitable as one likes. One proposal is to 
issue each child a voucher of the same value, to be used for payment of tuition 
fees at any state or private school (Gintis, 1995); for an alternative proposal, 
see Reich (2000). Exceptions could be made for children with learning 
disabilities or special needs, who would be eligible for a larger voucher. To 
keep this system egalitarian, it is important to prevent schools from charging 
fees in addition to the voucher. Otherwise, political pressure might lead to a 
reduction in the size of the voucher, thus segregating the poor in substandard 
schools while the middle-class and wealthy add to their vouchers at better 
schools. 
 
Voucher schemes, then, are not inherently egalitarian or otherwise: it 
depends on their design. From an egalitarian perspective, the worst possible 
scheme is one that exempts government schools from the voucher system, and 
provides partial vouchers, insufficient to cover full tuition, to students who 
transfer to private schools. These vouchers are worthless unless parents 
supplement them with money of their own. The consequences of such a 
scheme would be a flight of children of middle- and upper-class parents to 
private schools, leaving the poor without any meaningful choice. This happens 
even without vouchers, but this type of voucher scheme accelerates the 
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process.  Vouchers result in greater inequality only because the poor lack 
effective purchasing power. 
 
To sum up, those who have the interests of the disadvantaged at heart 
should not oppose school choice. Rather, they should work to design systems 
of education and finance that favour the poor, the inarticulate and the 
underprivileged, in contrast to current systems that so often trap children in 
failing schools and allow meaningful choice only for the wealthy, the articulate 
and the privileged. 
 
 
Recent developments in India 
 
The PROBE Team in 1996 sampled rural schools in four educationally back-
ward states of India—Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh—
where they found little teaching activity and very poor facilities. Absenteeism 
was widespread. For example, “in one-third of all the schools covered by the 
PROBE survey, the headmaster was absent at the time of the investigators’ 
visit” (p. 46). And, as already noted, in half the sample schools there was no 
teaching activity at all at the time of the visit. In addition, the investigators 
found 59 percent of the schools with no water supply, 89 percent without a 
functioning toilet, 52 percent without a playground, 77 percent without a 
library and 26 percent without a blackboard in every classroom (PROBE 
Team, p. 42). 
 
 There is no evidence that teaching quality has improved in subsequent 
years. If anything, it may have become worse. Kremer et al. (2005) made three 
unannounced visits to each of 3700 primary schools, a nationally represent-
tative sample drawn from all states of India. They found a quarter of the 
teachers were absent from school on the days of the visit. Of those present, 
only 45 percent were actually engaged in teaching. Private school teachers’ 
absenteeism was 8 percentage points lower than government school teachers 
in the same village. This may well reflect a greater risk of being fired for 
absenteeism in a private school. Only one head teacher in the nearly 3000 
government schools recalled ever dismissing a teacher for repeated absence or 
tardiness, whereas head teachers in 35 of the 600 private schools reported 
such a dismissal. Unfortunately, however, these public/private comparisons 
are marred by the fact that private schools were sampled only in rural villages, 
whereas government schools were drawn from both rural villages and urban 
areas. It is likely that standards for private schools are higher in urban areas, 
where there is more competition. 
 
 School infrastructure, in contrast to teaching, has definitely improved 
since the PROBE survey of 1996, although much remains to be done. The 
ASER 2007 survey of rural schooling (Pratham, 2008, p. 49) found that 74 
percent of sampled primary schools had water (up from 69 percent in 2005 
and 41 percent in the PROBE survey) and 59 percent had a functioning toilet 
(up from 48 percent in 2005 and 11 percent in the PROBE survey). 
Remarkably, 93 percent of schools were serving students a midday meal on 
the day of the visit (up from 71 percent in 2005). This represents a huge 
change from 1996. School meals were launched nation-wide in August of 1995, 
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but not one of the schools visited by the PROBE Team (1999, pp. 95-97) in 
September-December 1996 had introduced school meals. 
 
 The PROBE Team (1999, p. 102) found widespread private schooling in 
rural villages, even though this was “often thought to be confined to urban 
areas”. Moreover, private schools were most common in villages where 
government schools were most dysfunctional.  Private schooling, then, seems 
to be driven more by poor quality of government schools than by level of 
income. Among sample households in the four PROBE states, 18% of school-
going children were enrolled in private schools. This statistic varied widely, 
however, registering 36 percent in Uttar Pradesh and 5 to 11 percent in the 
other three states. Moreover, parents obviously were making sacrifices in 
addition to tuition expenses to send their children to private schools, as 
evidenced by the fact that half of the private school children attended a school 
outside there own village (compared to 11 percent of government school 
children). 
 
 In India, private schools’ share of enrolment would seem to be a good 
(inverse) summary measure of the quality of government schooling. By this 
measure, school quality has fallen in rural India over the past decade and a 
half. Between 1993 and 2007, the proportion of primary students in private 
schools increased from 10.3 to 18.0 percent, a near doubling. For middle 
school, private schooling nearly tripled, from 7.9 to 23.0 percent, over the 
same period. (See table 1.) These estimates are based on household surveys, so 
include both recognized and unrecognized schools. Official statistics are based 
solely on recognized schools—those with a right to confer degrees—and show 
much less private schooling in India. 
 
 
Table 1:  Rural India, private schools’ share of enrolment in basic 
                  education, 1993-2007 (percent) 
 
Year Primary School Middle School 
1993 10.1 7.9 
2005 16.2 19.5 
2006 19.5 20.3 
2007 18.0 23.0 
 
Note: All estimates are based on household survey data, and include both 
recognized and unrecognized private schools. Official statistics include only 
recognized schools, so show a much lower private share of enrolment.  
Sources: Kingdon (2007, p. 184), ASER 2005 (Pratham, 2006, p. 16), and 
ASER 2007 (Pratham, 2008, p. 43). 
 
 
 The PROBE Team also visited schools in a fifth state—Himachal 
Pradesh—where the quality of teaching, though not the physical 
infrastructure, was far superior to that in the four ‘educationally backward’ 
PROBE states. The survey findings for this state are reported in a separate 
chapter.  The PROBE Team had nothing but praise for the “schooling 
revolution” in Himachal Pradesh. This success, they note, is the result of a 
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commitment of the state government to education as well as the previously-
mentioned parental vigilance and collective action. Himachal Pradesh spends 
(or spent) about twice as much per-capita on education as the rest of India, 
and the pupil-teacher ratio in sample schools was 27, approximately half the 
ratio of 50 observed in the four PROBE states. Numbers of teachers on the 
payroll mean nothing, of course, if they are absent or do not teach. “The 
problem of teacher inertia, so devastating in other states, is not entirely absent 
in Himachal Pradesh, but it is much less widespread” (p. 120). Precise figures 
are not reported. 
 
 One result of this success, according to the PROBE Team (1999, p. 120) 
is “the virtual absence of private schools in rural areas of Himachal Pradesh. 
This vacuum is not due to the absence of purchasing power among parents …. 
Rather, it fits in a general pattern …: private schools are most common in 
areas where government schools do not function. Conversely, if government 
schools function well, there may be little scope for private schools, as seems to 
be the case in rural Himachal Pradesh”. The PROBE Team never reports 
precisely what percent of enrolment was in private schools in Himachal 
Pradesh, but in a methodological appendix note (p. 144) that parents in the 48 
sample villages of that state had access to 48 government schools but only 6 
private schools. 
 
 Since Himachal Pradesh was an outlier with excellent performance in 
1996, it is interesting to see how well the state has done in recent years, 
compared to the four ‘educationally backward’ PROBE states. Student 
enrolment in private schools, we have seen, is an excellent summary measure 
of the quality of government schools in India. The poorer the quality of a 
government school, the more attractive is a private alternative. Table 2 reports 
three years of private schooling numbers for rural areas of Himachal Pradesh, 
the four PROBE states, and the all India average. In 2005 private schooling 
was less common in Himachal Pradesh than in any of the four PROBE states. 
In the subsequent two years, private schooling expanded everywhere, but 
especially in Himachal Pradesh. By 2007, 22.5 percent of the state’s students 
were enrolled in private schools. This figure is higher than that for India as a 
whole, and higher than two of the four PROBE states. The inescapable con-
clusion is that the quality of government schools must have fallen sharply—at 
least quality as perceived by parents of school-age children. 
 
 Another striking statistic of table 2 is the low and declining importance 
of private schools in rural Bihar state. Is this indicative of a “schooling 
revolution” similar to that of Himachal Pradesh? Bihar is not a wealthy state, 
nor is it known for excellence in teaching. What seems to be happening is that 
Bihar parents are enrolling their children in part-time private tuition classes 
rather than full-time private schools (see table 3). One can only speculate why 
after-school private tuition is so popular in Bihar, but with 50 percent of 
government school students enrolled in these courses, it may well account for 
the low demand for spaces in full-time private schools. 
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Table 2:  Rural India, private schools’ share of enrolment in 
                  Himachal Pradesh and the PROBE states, 2005-2007 11 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on household survey data, and include both 
recognized and unrecognized private schools. Basic education covers children 
aged 6-10 years (primary school) and 11-14 years (middle school). The original 
source reports share of children in private schools; the calculations above are 
the private schools’ share of school going children. In all of rural India in 
2005, 16.3% of children attended private schools and 6.5% were not in school, 
so the percentage of students enrolled in private schools was 16.3(1-065)=17.4. 
Source: ASER 2006 (Pratham, 2007, p. 36), and ASER 2007 (Pratham, 2008, 
p. 47). 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Rural India, % of government school children attending  
                  private tuition classes in Himachal Pradesh and the  
                  PROBE states, 2007 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Primary school is the average for years 1 to 5; middle school is the 
average for years 6 to 8. 
Source: ASER 2007 (Pratham, 2008, pp. 45, 61, 87, 93, 111, 139). 
 
 
 
Freedom of choice in Sweden 
 
Caroline Hoxby (2006), a Harvard economist who specializes in education, 
lists three elements that she believes are crucial if school choice is to result in 
improved school quality. These are: 
 
1. supply flexibility; 
2. money that follows students; 
3. independent management of schools. 
State % (aged 6-14) in private school 
 2005 2006 2007 
Himachal Pradesh 7.2 15.0 22.5 
Bihar 11.0 12.7 7.9 
Madhya Pradesh 8.7 11.7 13.5 
Rajasthan 25.3 28.3 28.6 
Uttar Pradesh 30.0 32.5 30.3 
All India 17.4 20.2 20.1 
State Primary School Middle School 
Himachal Pradesh 3.0 6.2 
Bihar 35.1 50.2 
Madhya Pradesh 5.3 9.4 
Rajasthan 2.5 6.2 
Uttar Pradesh 5.0 9.3 
All India 18.3 24.6 
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I agree that all three are necessary if quality is to improve, but I would add two 
additional elements to increase the odds that everyone benefits from choice. 
These are: 
 
4. schools do not choose students; and 
5. no school fees. 
 
By supply flexibility, Hoxby means that schools must be free to open, to 
expand, and to contract or close if they fail to attract students. The second 
essential element is that schools must lose some of its public financing when 
they lose a student, and the money that follows the student must be 
approximately equal to the schooling cost for that student. Unless money 
follows students there can be no supply flexibility, so the first element 
depends very much on the second. The third essential element is freedom to 
innovate, to hire (and fire) staff and to compete for students. If all schools are 
exactly alike, there is no meaningful choice. 
 
 Even though parents choose schools, schools should not be allowed to 
choose students. If a school has more applicants than spaces, selection should 
be based length of time in the queue or a lottery once priority has been given 
to applicants with siblings already enrolled in the school. This is the fourth 
element, which is essential for anyone who believes strongly in the ideal of 
equal access to basic education. Hoxby (2006, p. 29) disagrees. She argues 
“first, it is a mistake to eliminate all forms of selection into schools because 
there is a cost of eliminating variety; and second, the ability to select students 
can convey competitive advantages to a school ….” It is true that allowing 
schools to select students will increase the differences between schools. Faith-
based schools, for example, could restrict admission to those of the faith, and 
elite schools catering to students with high intelligence and scholastic aptitude 
could reject applicants of low intelligence and aptitude. But this is not the type 
of school variety envisaged by those who seek a more egalitarian society. In 
any case, restricting access to basic education seems contrary to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Hoxby’s points are appropriate for higher 
education, not basic education. In fact, I would be uncomfortable if medical 
schools, for example, failed to discriminate against students of low intelligence 
and aptitude. 
 
 The fifth essential element is prohibition of school fees, which 
discourage applications from parents with low incomes. Hoxby disagrees, 
although she concedes “top-up fees seem dangerous. They could be used by 
schools as a method of enforcing income segregation or, perhaps more 
worrisome, they could lead to the development of a two-tier education system 
under which the government per-student subsidy provides an inadequate 
education and affluent parents reveal this by all choosing to top up the subsidy 
substantially” (p. 25). Her solution is “allow schools to ask parents to top up if 
the school practises need-blind admission and gives need-based scholarships 
that eliminate top-up fees for poorer families” (p. 25). With such a system, 
students would be segregated by ability rather than income. The top up to 
finance higher-than-average school costs would be paid only by the better-off 
parents of students in each elite school. Such a top up is in reality a tax on 
affluent parents that increases with schooling costs and with the number of 
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scholarship students.  This makes sense for elite universities like Harvard, but 
not for basic schooling, which should be egalitarian rather than elitist. 
 
Sweden in 1992 embarked on a radical educational reform that satisfies 
all five of the essential elements for school choice listed above.  This reform 
followed decentralization of the educational system in 1990, when authority to 
run primary and secondary schools was transferred to the municipalities. 
 
Prior to 1992, Sweden’s school system allowed for little choice. 
Government assigned pupils to their closest school, and parents had little to 
say in the matter, short of moving to a different neighbourhood. Very few 
private schools existed; most were faith-based and accounted for less than one 
percent of students in compulsory schooling, which in Sweden is nine years 
starting at age 7. 
 
In 1992 everything changed. Anyone can now open a school, and 
municipalities are required to finance it on the same per-pupil terms as a 
government school. Regulations exist, but are mild. All schools must follow 
the national curriculum, and private schools must be approved by the 
National Agency for Education to receive funding. Few private school 
applications are rejected. The views of municipalities that fear competition are 
taken into account, but municipalities have no veto and are obligated to 
finance a private school once its establishment has been approved. Power for 
the most part has been transferred from government to parents, who by their 
choice of schools determine the allocation of government finance. The only 
limitation on parental choice is that municipal schools must admit all 
applicants who reside in the municipality. Only if there are additional spaces 
available can municipal schools accept applications of non-residents. Other 
than this restriction, and preferences for applicants with siblings already 
enrolled, schools cannot discriminate in any way. There are no religious 
requirements or entrance exams. If applicants exceed vacant spaces for a 
school, those first in the queue are the first to be admitted. Education is 
financed in part by municipal taxes, so per pupil expenditure does vary by 
municipality. But the grant per pupil does not vary by school and no school is 
allowed to charge top up fees regardless of the size of the municipal grant. 
 
There are no restrictions on ownership of private schools. Schools can 
be and are run by religious groups (Christian, Jewish, Muslim), teachers’ co-
operatives, parents’ co-operatives or for-profit corporations. If a registered 
school attracts and retains students, it receives funding from the students’ 
respective municipalities. Sweden has created a market for schooling, but it is 
a very egalitarian market because there is no price competition and each 
consumer has the same access to schools. Precisely because Sweden does not 
allow private schools to charge fees or select students, its system has attracted 
criticism from libertarian groups such as the Fraser Institute (1999). 
 
By no means all Swedish parents have deserted government schools, 
but the private share of enrolment has increased, and came to exceed 10 
percent in 2008. Surprisingly few of the new private schools are faith-based, 
but many are run for profit, some as chains of schools. The largest chain, 
Kunskapsskolan (“Knowledge Schools”), runs 30 schools with 700 employees 
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and nearly 10,000 students. Its schools are very high-tech and rely on the 
Kunskapsporten (“Knowledge Portal”), a website that contains the entire 
syllabus, allows each student to work at his or her own level, and provides 
parents with a logbook that records their child’s weekly progress. Teachers are 
monitored as well, and the most successful are given bonuses for good 
performance. The Economist compares Kunskapsskolan’s management style 
to that of IKEA, the Swedish furniture company, which standardizes its 
products and gets customers involved in final assembly. (See Anonymous, 
2008.) 
 
Three econometric studies have examined the effect of introduction of 
school choice on the quality of education in Sweden: Ahlin (2003), Sandström, 
and Bergström (2005) and Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007). All three studies 
exploit the fact that private schooling varies by municipality, and all find that 
everyone gains from competition—pupils who remain in government schools 
as well as those who choose a private option. The reason this happens is that 
government schools, faced with competition from private schools, must 
improve their performance or lose pupils and funding. The collective gains for 
all parents living in a municipality are, in fact, greater than the individual 
gains of those who choose private schooling. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007), 
for example, calculate that a 10 percentage point increase in private school 
share increases average grades overall by nearly one percentile point, but the 
individual gain from attending private school rather than government school 
is only one-tenth of a percentile point. Because gains are so disperse, all social 
and economic groups appear to benefit from introduction of choice. Even 
classroom teachers prefer the new system. 
 
These three initial empirical studies are excellent, but do have some 
shortcomings. First, although school choice in Sweden applies, with some 
restrictions, equally to choice of government school, none of the studies take 
this into account. If government schools are competing with each other, and 
not just with private schools, the full effect of school choice on quality of 
schooling might be greater than measured in these studies. Second, 
expenditure per pupil is higher in municipalities with a higher private share, 
and this is taken by Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007, p. 39) as “evidence of a 
positive effect of private schooling on school costs”.  An alternative, more 
plausible explanation is that the incentive to open private schools is greater in 
municipalities with higher per pupil expenditure (Björklund et al., 2005, pp. 
110-111).    
 
 
Lack of choice in Finland 
 
Finland attracts more international attention than Sweden, and for a different 
reason. After years of lacklustre, average performance in international 
examinations, Finland’s students came to perform at or near the top in PISA, 
the Programme for International Student Assessment that the OECD in the 
year 2000 began to administer to fifteen-year old students every three years. 
In 2006, the year of the latest PISA exam, Finland ranked first on the science 
scale, and second in reading and mathematical performance. 
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 Everyone wants to know, in the words of a Wall Street Journal article, 
“What makes Finnish kids so smart?” (Gamerman, 2008). The roots of the 
country’s success lie in two reforms implemented in the 1970s. The 
Comprehensive School Reform (1972-1975) extended compulsory schooling 
from eight to nine years and replaced the dual-track vocational and grammar 
(university preparatory) schools with mixed-ability comprehensive schools. 
The Teacher Education Reform (1973-1979) raised the requirements for 
primary school teachers from a three-year certificate from a teachers’ training 
college to a five-year Master’s degree from a university. Comprehensive 
schools give all Finnish children from age seven access to the same basic 
education, instead of sorting them immediately into academic and non-
academic streams. High academic standards transformed teaching into a 
high-status profession that attracts many of the Finland’s brightest secondary 
school graduates (Simola, 2005, pp. 458-459; Sahlberg, 2007, pp. 154-155). 
 
 These early reforms, though important, by themselves cannot account 
for Finland’s transition in education from an average performer during the 
1980s and 1990s to a star international performer beginning in 2000. The key 
element to explain this seems to be development of what Sahlberg (2007, pp. 
156-157) refers to as a “culture of trust”. Finnish education was highly 
centralized before the reforms of the 1970s, and remained so until 1985 when 
there was a gradual shift toward trusting schools in general and classroom 
teachers in particular. By the early 1990s Finnish teachers had obtained 
freedom that public school teachers in many other countries (though not 
India!) might envy. “The school inspectorate, a detailed national curriculum, 
officially approved teaching materials, weekly timetables based on subjects 
taught and a class diary in which the teacher had to record what was taught 
each hour—all these traditional mechanisms were abandoned” (Simola, 2005, 
pp. 464-465). The system works well because teachers are exceptionally well 
trained and “parents trust teachers as professionals who know what is best for 
their children” (Sahlberg, 2007, p. 155). Ironically for a nation that performs 
well in international exams, Finland has never experimented with 
standardized tests at the compulsory school level. 
 
 School choice in Finland is extremely limited, almost non-existent. 
Each child is assigned to the closest public comprehensive school. Plato and 
Aristotle would approve of the uniformity of this system; John Stuart Mill and 
Karl Marx would not. Private schools are given state funding comparable to a 
municipal school of the same size, must admit applicants on the same basis as 
municipal schools, and cannot charge fees. This sounds similar to the system 
in effect in Sweden, but there is one big difference. Establishment or 
expansion of a private school requires a political decision. This is rarely given, 
so few private schools exist, most of them faith-based, and they are not 
allowed to expand. 
 
 The Finnish classroom is very different from a typical Swedish class-
room. It is decidedly low-tech. There are no computers, overhead projectors 
instead of PowerPoint, and chalkboards instead of whiteboards (Gamerman, 
2008). Teachers are professional but their teaching methods are very 
conservative, authoritarian and distant. Hannu Simola (2005, p. 463), 
professor of education at the University of Helsinki, discovered in an interview 
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study of Danish, Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian teachers that “Finnish 
teachers differ from their Nordic colleagues in their relations with pupils and 
their families. While other Nordic teachers almost unanimously emphasized 
intimate, personal and confidential relations, Finnish teachers spoke to their 
pupils mostly as adult models and keepers of order and safety in the 
classroom. Rather than encouraging intimacy, some experienced Finnish 
teachers emphasized how important it was to keep a certain professional 
distance from their pupils and their homes and problems.”  
 
 Finnish comprehensive schools are very egalitarian. There are no 
special classes for gifted students, nor is there streaming by ability. All 
students stay together in the same class, and bright students are expected to 
tutor backward students to bring them up to par. A special educational system 
for ‘difficult’ pupils—approximately a quarter of the cohort in recent years—
provides extra services for lagging students to bring them up to the level of 
regular class. This special education, in the milieu of an exceptionally 
homogeneous Finnish population, has “the effect of unifying and harmonizing 
the groups taught by the classroom teacher” (Simola, 2005, p. 465).  
  
 Because of its egalitarian system—essentially the same basic school for 
everyone—Finland performs well in international comparisons not only in the 
level of student performance, but also in the variance of student performance 
across schools. For the science scale of PISA 2006, Finland not only ranked 
first of all participating countries, it also had the smallest variance between 
schools. (See figure 1.) The within-school variance for Finland, in contrast, 
was quite high—well above the average for the OECD. Each Finnish school, in 
other words, contains a heterogeneous mixture of students of varying ability, 
but the schools themselves are extremely homogeneous in terms of 
educational outcomes. This result is all the more remarkable when we recall 
that Finland, unlike other countries, has no streaming within its schools. 
Finnish classrooms, like its schools, are a mix of diverse students, but very 
homogeneous in terms of outcomes. 
 
 Finland has been very successful in attaining the twin goals of equity 
and efficiency in basic education. This success has come at a price, though, 
namely flagrant violation of a basic human right, the right of all parents “to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children”. The vast 
majority of Finnish parents, it is true, are satisfied with the basic education 
their children receive. But human rights are individual rights, not collective 
rights. Human rights exist to protect individuals and minorities from the 
tyranny of dictators and from the tyranny of majorities. Violation of any 
human right, then, should not be taken lightly. Available evidence is rather 
dated, but a 1995 survey of parents’ attitudes toward comprehensive school 
showed that while 86% of respondents were satisfied with the teaching, only 
48% were satisfied with treatment of a student’s individuality, and 28% 
expressed dissatisfaction on this account (Simola, 2005, 458). A significant 
minority of Finnish parents is concerned with the absence of special classes or 
activities for gifted students and with what they perceive to be excessive 
homogenization of basic education.  
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Figure 1:  Variance in student performance within schools and  
                    between schools on the science scale (PISA 2006) 
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 Despite Finland’s high standing in the world of education today, not 
everyone is optimistic about the future of schooling in that country. Professor 
Simola (pp. 465-466), for example, concedes “it is still possible to teach in the 
traditional way in Finland because teachers believe in their traditional role 
and pupils accept their traditional position”, but he asks “what will happen to 
teaching and learning in Finnish schools when teachers no longer believe in 
their traditional mission to be model citizens and transmitters of knowledge, 
but rather see themselves as facilitators, tutors and mentors. What will 
happen to teaching and learning in Finnish schools when the pupils no longer 
accept their position as pupils, but rather ‘climb the walls’, as one urban 
primary-school principal put it?” 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
India’s educational system, like that of many countries, has evolved into a two-
tier system of schooling. Most Indian children are trapped in government 
schools of low quality. Those who can afford it pay full fees to place their 
children in private schools, and their numbers are increasing every year. There 
are two ways out of this inequitable and inefficient impasse, and they are at 
opposite ends of the school choice continuum. One possibility is to move the 
system closer to that of Finland, by prohibiting all independent schools. The 
second possibility is to move to a system like that of Sweden, with government 
paying the same grant per pupil to private and government schools. 
 
 India already has one part of the Finnish system in place: public school 
teachers enjoy nearly complete freedom and autonomy. What they lack is the 
training and professional ethics of Finnish teachers. The Finnish system is 
“trust based” without external exams or monitoring. This is a system that is 
difficult to replicate. As Sahlberg (2007, p. 157) explains, “The culture of trust 
can only flourish in an environment that is built upon good governance and 
close-to-zero corruption. …. Trusting schools and teachers [in Finland] is 
therefore a natural consequence of a generally well-functioning civil society 
and high social capital. Honesty and trust … are often seen as among the most 
basic values and the building blocks of Finnish society.” These demands would 
seem to rule out consideration of the Finnish model, certainly for India, and 
perhaps for any country other than present-day Finland. 
  
 The second possibility—the Swedish model—is a viable option and has 
the added advantage that it respects human rights.  A major problem in India 
is the total lack of accountability of public school teachers. Expanding school 
choice to everyone—beyond the circle of parents with sufficient income to pay 
private fees—the government in effect would be employing millions of parents 
as performance monitors. If a school fails to satisfy expectations, at the end of 
the school year parents will ‘vote with their feet’, and the money government 
spends on education will follow the child. 
 
 Not all details of the Swedish system are likely to be implemented in 
India. Because of wide disparities in income and wealth, it will no doubt be 
necessary to allow independent, fee-charging schools to continue operation. 
But no public money should go to such schools. Recognized private schools 
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that choose to receive public money should not be allowed to charge top up 
fees. In exchange, these publicly-financed private schools would receive the 
same grant per pupil as government schools receive in the same community. It 
is true that private schools currently operate with much lower expenses than 
public schools, but there is no reason to discriminate against them in funding. 
Greater income will allow them to upgrade facilities and increase staff and 
salaries. If the Swedish experience is any guide, the quality of government 
schools will increase as well.  
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